51 Union of Turkish Bar Associations Review 2023 Erdem DOĞAN the starting point in solving the problem of whether an entity can be recognized as a personality is determining the meaning, scope and legal characteristic of the concept of personality. In the second stage, the entity, which is envisaged to be granted personality rights, is subjected to an evaluation process within the framework of the material approach, which sees personality as an existential structure, and the formal approach, which is based on whether the law and society ascribe personality to an entity. The view that considers personality from a material perspective and accordingly adopts the philosophical and moral dimension of personality argues that as a rule, entities other than humans cannot be granted personality rights. The view that adopts personality in a formal sense, on the other hand, argues that whether the law and society ascribe personality to an entity will be decisive in the solution of the personality problem.5 In this context, according to the approach advocating the formal personality, in the formation of such a decision, the scope of the rights and duties envisaged to be granted and the nature of the capabilities of that entity play an important role, rather than the physical structure, technical features or other complex functions of the assets in question. The determination of these qualifications will also guide the determination of the scope and limits of the rights and obligations envisaged for artificial intelligence systems.6 The decision to grant legal personality to non-biological entities depends on pragmatic as well as conceptual consequences. Accordingly, the degree of functionality and social roles of artificial intelligence entities in the social structure, whether they will be generally accepted by the society, will determine whether they can acquire legal status.7 The effective and indispensable roles of artificial intelligence systems in social and economic life and certain human-specific 5 Mireille Hildebrandt, “From Galatea 2.2 to Watson – and Back?”: M. Hildebrandt and J. Gaakeer (eds.), (Human Law and Computer Law: Comparative Perspectives, Springer 2013, s. 18; J. Frederick White, Personhood: An Essential Characteristic of the Human Species, The Linacre Quarterly, 2013;80(1), p. 74. 6 Tyler Jaynes, Legal personhood for artificial intelligence: citizenship as the exception to the rule, 2019, AI & SOCIETY, p. 2. 7 Samir Chopra/Laurence F. White, A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents; The University of Michigan Press, E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.356801 USA, 2011, p. 156 - 157.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTQ3OTE1