53 Union of Turkish Bar Associations Review 2023 Erdem DOĞAN have determined the course of this issue.11 Because, in no period of history, a concrete and binding criterion has been determined in terms of granting personality rights to non-human beings, and a consistent and uniform application has not been developed as to whether being a biological human is a necessary element in order to have personality. For example, in Roman law, while some non-human entities such as monasteries, cities, and rivers were granted personality rights, rights were not recognized for spouses and children who were subject to pater familias. Pater familias became the subject of legal rights and obligations on behalf of the household, while the wife and children of pater familias could only indirectly enjoy legal rights. In this period, since strict family economy conditions were dominant rather than state power, each family had its own rules of law, customs and traditions. As a result of this situation, the law of persons was also shaped within the framework of the rules and beliefs that were valid in the society.12 Regardless of the valid administrative or legal system , the only power in the recognition of personality throughout human history has been the state and political will. The political will has used this preference by making laws within the framework of the current legal system or by introducing regulatory provisions under another name.13 There is no doubt that changing social needs and economic developments are also determinants in the formation of the political will. 14As a matter of fact, the legal rules regulating the relations of individuals with each other in social life have only granted legal capacity to real persons in the past. With the aforementioned regulations, only granting rights and personality to people was a necessity rather than an option. Because social life and relations consisted only of people. Over time, the change in social structure and relations has made it necessary to grant personality to other entities as well as legal entities.15 Since the Middle 11 Chopra/White, Autonomous Artificial Agents, p. 157. 12 Çelebican, p. 160.; Chopra/White, Autonomous Artificial Agents, p. 157; Ersoy, p. 86. 13 Chopra/White, Autonomous Artificial Agents, p. 155. 14 Kılıçoğlu, Medeni Hukuk, p. 7; Bilge Öztan, Medeni Hukukun Temel Kavramları, 44th ed., Ankara 2019, p. 3 Çelebican, p. 178; Zevkliler/Ertaş/Havutçu/Acabey/ Gürpınar, p. 1; Nomer, p. 1. 15 Solaiman, s. 12; Ugo Pagallo, Vital, Sophia, and Co.—The Quest for the Legal Personhood of Robots, Law School, University of Turin, Information 2018, 9, 230, p. 4 - 9. doi:10.3390/info9090230.SET:20.7.2020.
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