56 The Search for A New Legal Personality in The Digital Age: Artificial Intelligence the doctrine that artificial intelligence beings have humanoid abilities and that these beings should be granted a unique personality status, provided that this situation is determined.22 The reasons for the approach that rejects granting personality rights to entities based on artificial intelligence and robotic technology are generally as follows: Since human beings are superior beings that dominate all beings, non-human beings cannot be granted personality rights, in order to obtain personality, they must have the ability to have rights and obligations, recognition of personality will be a negative decision for the future of humanity, and it is necessary to determine the legal responsibility of artificial intelligence and to take legal action. It is based on issues such as that it is not necessary for artificial intelligence to gain personality status because artificial intelligence can perform its functions in other ways without gaining personality status, and that such intelligent machines have not yet met the necessary conditions to gain personality status.23 The view that rejects legal personality, based on its acceptance of humans as superior beings that dominate all beings, argues that artificial intelligence is the subject of property law or that there is a slavery-like relationship between humans and artificial intelligence, and also argues that legal relations and responsibility should be determined within this framework.24 The approach that accepts legal personality recognition for nonbiological intelligence deals with personality not in its moral or Hukuki Sorumluluk, TAAD, S. 35, Y. 9, Temmuz 2018, p. 218; Sinan Sami Akkurt, Yapay Zekânın Otonom Davranışlarından Kaynaklanan Hukukî Sorumluluk, Uyuşmazlık Mahkemesi Dergisi, Y. 7, I.13, Haziran 2019, p. 44, 22 Solum, p. 1284; Gabriel Hallevy, Virtual Criminal Responsibility, Original Law Review, 2010, 6(1), p. 6 vd; ASARO Peter; Robots and responsibility from a legal perspective, 2007, http://www.peterasaro.org/writing SET:14.8.2020; Pagallo, (Legal Personhood), p. 1 vd.; Chopra/White, Autonomous Artificial Agents, p. 157; Emre Bayamlıoğlu, Akıllı Yazılımlar ve Hukuki Statüsü: Yapay Zekâ ve Kişilik Üzerine Bir Deneme”, Uğur Alacakaptan’a Armağan V. - 2, 1. B., İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul 2008, p. 138 23 Pagallo, (Legal Personhood), p. 7; Hildebrandt, p. 18; Peter Asaro, Robots and responsibility from a legal perspective; 2007, http://www.peterasaro.org/writing; SET:14.8.2020; Bayamlıoğlu, p. 138; Hallevy, p. 6. 24 Solum, p. 1284; Bak, Yapay Zekânın Hukuki Statüsü ve Sorumluluk, p. 218; Seda Kara Kılıçarslan, Yapay Zekânın Hukuki Statüsü ve Hukuki Kişiliği Üzerine Tartışmalar, YBHD, 2019/2, p. 378.
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