57 Union of Turkish Bar Associations Review 2023 Erdem DOĞAN philosophical sense, but in its form and legal dimension. Accordingly, the aforementioned view accepts that a personality specific to artificial intelligence can be established and puts forward various solution suggestions for determining personality. These include suggestions such as establishing a legal entity-like structure, recognizing the electronic personality model, developing the concept of non-human persons, and adopting limited-purpose personality or quasipersonality models.25 The view that adopts the liberal, egalitarian personality approach argues that if a being has sufficient characteristics to gain personality, that being should be accepted as a person, and argues that granting personality to non-biological beings will break the negative perception on the human race due to the slavery system in the past.26 In addition, the aforementioned view argues that the world will become more equal and peaceful in terms of social relations and the role of humanity in our increasingly technological age. This view accuses the approach that rejects the recognition of personality, claiming that they attribute different values to non-human beings simply because of the species they belong to, of chauvinist protection of a special status for biological creatures, that is, of speciesism.27 25 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal personhood for artificial intelligence. North Carolina Law Review, 70(4), p. 1284; ZIMMERMAN, Evan J.: Machine Minds: Frontiers In Legal Personhood, Zimmerman, Evan, Machine Minds: Frontiers in Legal Personhood, February 12, 2015, p. 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2563965. SET.3.9.2020. ASARO, Robots and responsibility from a legal perspective, 2007, http://www. peterasaro.org/writing; Bayamlıoğlu, p. 138; Kılıçarslan, p. 377 vd. Murat Volkan Dülger, Yapay Zekalı Varlıkların Hukuk Dünyasına Yansıması: Bu Varlıkların Hukuki Statüleri Nasıl Belirlenmeli? Terazi Hukuk Dergisi, V. 13, I. 142, Haziran 2018, p. 85. 26 Chopra/White, Autonomous Artificial Agents, s. 186; David Calverley, Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person, Springer-Verlag London Limited 2007, published online: 13 March 2007, Springer-Verlag London Limited 2007, AI & Soc (2008) 22: p. 523. status.irational.org/legal_person_machine.pdf. Gunther Teubner, Rights of Non-humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 33, 2006, p. 6. 27 For detailed information about “speciesism” see, Peter Singer, Hayvan Özgürleşmesinin 30. Yılı, New York Review of Books, V. 50, N. 8, 15.5.2003, (Hayrullah Doğan), https://www.birikimdergisi.com/dergiler/birikim/1/sayi-195temmuz-2005/2379/hayvan-ozgurlesmesinin-30-yili/5909.SET:11.8.2020; Samir Chopra/Laurence F. White, Artificial Agents: Personhood in Law and Philosophy, 2015, https://www.researchgate.net. SET.17.9.2020.
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