59 Union of Turkish Bar Associations Review 2023 Erdem DOĞAN The moral view of personhood recognizes that only humans are highly self-conscious beings with the capacity of thinking, planning, biological intelligence, emotion, as well as physical capacity. Therefore, humans are in a unique position compared to other beings. Based on this idea, it is accepted that since only people can be the subject of rights and obligations, people should also have an independent personality right.29 According to the approach referred to as “natural rights theory”, people have non-assignable and indefeasible rights from birth. 30 Humans have acquired legal personality within the framework of these rights they have. 31 In this context, minors or wards or an individual in a vegetative state, also have personality rights. In contrast, since the basic idea of designing AI as a being belongs to humans, AI’s freedom and status as a moral being are inherently denied. As a reflection of this view, the relationship between humans and other beings should be evaluated within the scope of either property law or slavery.32 aa. Artificial Intelligence Lacking the Required Qualities for Personality Some authors argue that since personality is a reflection of intelligence and internal abilities, it should only be valid for conscious beings, and accordingly, artificial intelligence cannot achieve personality because it does not yet have the necessary qualities for personality. However, according to this view, non-biological entities should also be granted a legal status if they acquire humanspecific abilities such as consciousness, will, autonomy, emotion and intelligence.33 Because if it has these abilities, artificial intelligence will turn into a conscious being, that is, a moral personality. 34It is also stated that while granting personality to individuals who do not 29 Hildebrandt, p. 18. 30 Işıl Bayar Bravo, Thomas Hobbes ve John Locke’un Doğal Hak Anlayışları, p. 74, 75. http://hfsa-sempozyum.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HFSA23-B.- Bravo.pdf.SET.15.8.2020. 31 Solum, p. 1259. 32 Bertolini, p. 225; Solaiman, p. 29. 33 Calverley, p. 527, Zimmerman, p. 22, 41, Bertolini, p. 217. 34 Dorna Behdadi/Christian Munthe, A Normative Approach to Artifcial Moral Agency, Minds & Machines 30, 2020, p. 197.
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