60 The Search for A New Legal Personality in The Digital Age: Artificial Intelligence have the power to distinguish, denying it to artificial intelligence with advanced human abilities would be contrary to equality and the liberal theory’s definition of personality. From this perspective, it is argued that if artificial intelligence systems meet the necessary conditions for personality, they should gain the right to self-property within the scope of Locke’s liberal personality theory.35 The question of whether non-biological intelligence can become a humanoid entity with human-specific abilities such as consciousness, will, autonomy, emotion and intelligence is an important subject of cognitive and philosophical theories. The view that approaches this question positively claims that artificial intelligence can experience emotions. Accordingly, emotion is a facet of the human mind, and if the human mind can be explained by a computational model, the basis of artificial intelligence is a system based on modelling the human brain, then emotion can also become a cognitive process. In this context, if human emotions obey the laws of nature, then theoretically, a computer program could also imitate the operation of these laws. Therefore, artificial intelligence will be able to produce outputs and behaviours that mimic human intelligence.36 According to the view that argues that non-biological intelligence cannot have human-specific abilities, even if artificial intelligence produces behaviours that imitate human intelligence, consciousness and emotions, this will never mean that artificial intelligence has real emotions, consciousness and intelligence. Because no matter how perfect the simulation performed by artificial intelligence seems, a computer simulation of an earthquake never means an earthquake.37 Furthermore, autonomy and the right to self-determination alone are not sufficient to grant legal personality to any entity. As a matter of fact, in the historical process, gaining legal rights has been conditioned on assuming social obligations and duties. Thus, the aforementioned condition has made it necessary for the entity to be attributed 35 Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophyhttps://plato.stanford.edu/SET.29.9.2020; Solum, p. 1276. 36 Owen J. Flanagan, The Science of The Mind, Second Edition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1991, p. 253. (Solum, p. 1270). 37 Solum, p. 1275.
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