67 Union of Turkish Bar Associations Review 2023 Erdem DOĞAN The approach that rejects granting legal personality to artificial intelligence argues that it is inappropriate to compare artificial intelligence to animals in terms of being able to act voluntarily. However, it accepts that the provisions regarding animals may be applied due to damages caused by artificial intelligence in the context of civil liability. Thus, it is claimed that damages caused by artificial intelligence can be compensated within the scope of strict liability, without the need for recognition of personality. Basically, an animal is a biological entity with unique characteristics such as moody, docile and friendly. In this sense, it is different from legal entities and artificial intelligence systems in that it is a naturally living being and in terms of both the subjects it is trained in and the actions it carries out based on its own will. The responsibility of the persons who undertake the care and management of the animal can be invoked due to the damage caused to third parties due to the nature of the animal and its irregular behaviour that may cause behavioural deviation. Likewise, there is no obstacle for the manufacturer, owner or user of artificial intelligence systems to be held responsible for the damage caused by artificial intelligence. However, although artificial intelligence and animals are similar in some aspects, these similarities are insufficient to recognize personality in both entities. As a matter of fact, the lawsuit regarding chimpanzees in the USA was rejected on the grounds that chimpanzees do not have the capacity to have rights and assume debts.60 dd. Personality Not Being a Necessary Condition for Solving Problems Related to Artificial Intelligence According to this view, granting personality to artificial intelligence in order to determine legal liability is not a sine qua non solution. Because legal problems arising from artificial intelligence can be resolved without granting personality to artificial intelligence.61 60 Bertolini, p. 227; Solaiman, p. 12- 34; Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century; Penguin Press: USA, 2009, p. 415. Zimmerman, p. 33. 61 According to Pagallo, wherever there is a legal responsibility, there is a legal personality.However, considering the scope of responsibility that today’s artificial intelligence technologies have, it is not necessary to grant full legal personality
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