69 Union of Turkish Bar Associations Review 2023 Erdem DOĞAN apply to artificial intelligence in the context of legal liability.65 Thus, the financial positions of such smart machines will be made transparent.66 b. Overall Evaluation In summary, the view against granting personality to artificial intelligence sees personality as a set of values unique to humans and acquired from birth. It also argues that people do not have the authority to dispose of these values. 67This human-centred approach, which considers personality as an integral element of fundamental rights and duties, accepts that artificial intelligence does not have the ability to fulfil these rights and duties.68 On the other hand, the thoughts and behaviour of biological beings, especially humans, are influenced not only by the rational analysis of sensory input, but also by the endocrine system and various chemical messages over thousands of years. Humans have a unique level of intelligence, communication, self-awareness, and emotion. Even if intelligent machines devoid of these abilities may achieve emotion and self-consciousness in the future, they currently lack comprehension and feelings. Therefore, they can only imitate emotions and self-consciousness.69 The opinion in question regards the legal personality recognized for organisations, which has been adopted by all legal systems, as acceptable on the grounds that these organisations are actually composed of people, their capacity to act is exercised through humans, and the rights and duties related to their personalities basically refer to the rights and duties of the people behind them. In addition, when the ability of artificial intelligence to make independent decisions on its own is taken as a criterion, it is claimed that artificial intelligence does not meet the necessary conditions in terms of its level of development.70 In our opinion, in today’s world where a rapidly digitalizing social life prevails, the justifications based on the approach that rejects 65 Pagallo, Legal Personhood, p. 5; Ersoy, p. 86; Kılıçarslan, p. 378. 66 Pagallo, Legal Personhood, p. 5. 67 Friedmann, p. 50 – 51. 68 Solaiman, p. 11; Çetin, Yapay Zekâ ve Hukuk ile İlgili Güncel Tartışmalar, p. 54 69 Hubbard, Personhood, p. 442. 70 Solaiman, p. 35; Hubbard, Personhood, p. 442; Pagallo, Legal Personhood, p. 9.
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